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Ceramic Glass supplies the NHS with FireLite for critical care infrastructure in the battle against COVID-19

Ceramic Glass Ltd is playing a direct part in the fight against Covid-19, in support of the NHS. As part of our commitment to them, we are working on critical projects within the medical sector and supplying two NHS trusts, the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Cardiff & Vale University Local Health Board of NHS Wales, with our FireLite ceramic glass. Specifically developed to provide robust and stable fire-resistance, FireLite is being used in steel fire doors inside of negative pressure isolation units to protect both patients and key infrastructure.

At what is a difficult time for many, the safety and wellbeing of our staff, customers and suppliers remains our highest priority. Following the latest guidance from the government and Public Health England, our workforce is now working remotely where possible and staying at home in order to help the NHS and protect both themselves and their families.

Despite having a reduced workforce, our production continues. Those still in the factory are working hard and ensuring that we continue to meet the needs of every customer – especially those in the healthcare sector – while adhering to strict social distancing guidelines.

Should we see a further influx of orders from this sector, then those requests will take priority due to the nature of the current situation. We should stress, however, that our materials are available and our supply chains remain robust so we will aim to fulfil every order where we can and keep in contact with our customers should the situation change.

We hope that all our customers, suppliers and distributors remain safe and well at this time and we look forward to the future when a sense of normality can resume. In the meantime, we will continue to monitor and follow the latest guidance from both the government and Public Health England and keep in regular contact with our customers.

Please do not hesitate to get in touch with our team via phone or email should you have any enquiries.

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Fire safety: best done “Right First Time”

The growing cladding fiasco reminds us of a key principle that fire safety is best done “Right First Time” because trying to correct mistakes later on can be horrendously costly.

The Grenfell Fire catastrophe still casts a deep and dark shadow over fire safety. Residents of high-rise blocks continue to express profound dissatisfaction, more than two years after the fire, that they are living in questionably unsafe apartments and that they are faced by life-changing costs as they are left to shoulder the heavy burden of improvements that they can’t possibly be responsible for.

It is estimated that 196,000 people could still be living in dangerous buildings after the combustible cladding problem was first tragically exposed by the Grenfell fire. Using industry sources, the Sunday Times has reported that their investigation suggests 82,000 flats are potentially affected, and that the repair bill could be of the order of £1.4 bn in total (86% for private residences). That’s at least 6 times the £200 m Government has allocated to help with safety improvements for private  residences. The research is reported to cover residential blocks of all heights with questionable rainscreen cladding systems but excluding those built or refurbished before 2013.

No one, it seems, can really be sure on the full extent of the combustible cladding fiasco. And no one can really get a grasp of the upfront costs and the full lifetime costs accruing on residents from the psychological impacts and long-term loss of property values.

Leaseholders find themselves in a horrible trap, with responsibility and accountability landing at their doors when they can’t possibly be held in any way responsible for the original decisions concerning compliance with building regulations and key fire safety principles.

The Government’s new consultation this summer on the regulatory system talks a great deal at its heart of assigning responsibility and accountability through the design, build and regulatory process from start to finish in the occupation and management of the building. Presumably on that basis the issue of who should be held accountable and who should foot the bill for correcting errors in future will be different if this regulatory structural reform comes through into new legislation. But right now there is a massive problem that no one apparently seems able to solve.

Refurbishment costs for affected apartment blocks are variously estimated in the order of around £5m to even £9m depending on the block and what is necessary. Individual flat owners are reported to face personal bills of £70,000 to £80,000 as a share of the replacement and refurbishment costs. There are also costs on a continuous basis for round-the-clock fire warden inspections of around £16,500 per month per flat. Such costs are intolerable. And completely unreasonable. Residents are justified in thinking that responsibilities outlined in the Government regulatory consultation could quite reasonably be assumed to apply already in the normal course of providing building designs and constructions (just as safety is implicitly part of supplying a whole range of consumer products).

Fire safety crucially depends on three key principles for provisions built-into the fabric of the building.

Firstly, compartmentation to prevent fire and smoke spread to other parts of the building. The aim has to be to restrict the chance of fire spread, to localise the fire and make the job of suppression (for example by sprinklers) and extinguishing by the fire and rescue service as effective – safe, easy and quick – as possible. Secondly, comes fire separation to allow occupants to be alerted and to escape safely before conditions become untenable, physically isolated from fire. Thirdly, the fabric and structure of the building needs to be resilient and robust so that it can continue to stand up and resist aggressive fire spread both inside and outside by limiting destruction, burning and flaming. The best way to achieve those aims is by getting levels of fire protection right from the beginning.

Where lives are at stake then surely people and property should come first? Cost-cutting should be seen as false economy, because trying to modify and correct constructions at a later date is far more costly and dangerous in the long run. Function should come before cost. “Right First Time” for fire safety should accordingly be a key dominating principle that needs far more attention than has apparently been the case so far. Hopefully Government through its reforms will recognise that.

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COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Company Policy

With the impact of the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) outbreak being felt by businesses around the world, we want to make all stakeholders aware that we are taking our responsibilities seriously in relation to this significant global challenge.

Ensuring business continuity in light of events like pandemics is something we have been working towards over the last few years. When the first cases of Covid-19 were identified in the UK, we began to monitor and review the situation and put in place specific measures to manage the resulting risks.

We are taking the following specific actions:

* Wherever possible, we are engaging in electronic communication methods rather than face-to-
face meetings, in order to avoid any physical contact such as handshakes.
* We are following all government guidelines with respect to international travel and domestic
containment measures.
* We are undergoing regular cleaning of our offices.

We do not currently foresee any impact on the continuity of our service, but should the situation change we will notify you immediately. Although we believe the actions we have put in place are appropriate for the current levels of risk, they remain open to review.

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New Government guidance just in time for start of Grenfell Phase 2

New consolidated guidance from the Government’s Expert Panel made its timely appearance just before Phase 2 of the Grenfell Inquiry opened on 27 January with initial statements.

The guidance is for building owners of high-rise residential blocks, though its principles apply more widely. It stresses that resident safety should always be an urgent concern.

The focus is on cladding systems and the risks of fire spread over external walls. But owners are also reminded to assess all fire safety risks. They are advised (in effect directed?) to take steps to understand the building construction and its likely behaviour in fire.

Grenfell Phase 2, as well, is expected to focus in a forensic legal way on responsibilities.

That concerns decisions taken along the budgeting, design, specification, supply,construction and building management chain for the main products and product systems that Phase 1 concluded were major contributors to the violence of the fire.

Attention in Government guidance is also drawn to the risks of fire spread via windows, mentioning the surrounds, given that windows are an important element in any façade (and a factor in fire spread to the interior on floors above the initial fire break out).

It should be understood that normal window glazing does not have significant resistance against fire, including standard double glazing.

Glass products that are not specifically fire resistant readily fall apart in fire; and there is clearly a distinct risk of fire transfer both from the inside to the façade and from a burning façade back into the building through a window opening created when glass falls out.

Special fire-resistant glass and glazing systems are necessary to limit the risks of fire spread through windows – though UK practice does not make best use of f-r glazing in that way to limit the chances of fire spread by break out and then break back in from a burning façade.

Yet fire-resistant glazing is well-established for various internal applications, for many decades. It’s a common product, readily available and easily sourced. Fire-resistant glass used in the façade does not need to be particularly sophisticated: just integrity fire resistance performance would be enough to maintain effective containment.

For example, ceramic glass at only 5mm thick is immune to thermal stress. It can happily survive in fire conditions (uniquely) at such a thickness even when impacted with a firefighter cold hose stream, typically demonstrated after 4 hours’ exposure in a full-on standard fire test, sprayed on the hot face. That is a particularly significant benefit.

Glazing solutions are already available to reduce the severe risks of fire spread from inside to outside and from outside back inside. They just need to be specified and implemented.

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The Queen’s Speech signals stronger building fire safety

Rarely has such intent been expressed in a Queen’s Speech to bring into law measures to tighten fire safety.

Two bills have been announced:

The first, on building safety, addresses mainly lessons from the 2017 Grenfell fire with commitment to implement the recommendations from the Hackitt Review. The bill sets out to strengthen the whole regulatory regime – which presumably can be taken to include enforcement – for buildings and products. Part is also to give residents a stronger voice. Emphasis will be on responsibility and accountability. Making sure that the right people who make mistakes are brought to book is there and specifically noted.

Where products and building resilience are concerned then levels of performance will be emphasized.

That could, one can imagine, require a re-consideration towards longer resistance times given the uncertainty of fire and the extreme intensities of modern fires, as so
catastrophically shown by Grenfell. This may also mean wider use of barrier materials that are less vulnerable than others to thermal stress and high temperatures characteristic of modern fires.

The second bill, on fire safety, signals intent to implement the recommendations from the Moore Bick Grenfell enquiry. It aims to make sure that another Grenfell never happens again. And it will update the Fire Safety Order (2005).

That’s to include, for example, risk assessments of the façade concerning potential to affect everybody in common.

It’s possible to see that parts of fire safety building design will have to be reviewed, and they may in part mean improved levels of resilience and better assurance that constructions can adequately resist fire.

Much safer buildings will require better protection for occupiers to get out without risks to their lives, with much more time to do so, especially if circumstances determine they become trapped and more vulnerable due to heat and smoke.

More access may be necessary to more resilient sanctuaries than normally provided. Extended protected times to contain fire spread and protect against flames may well be critical. And construction will need to be robust enough to allow that to happen.

This Parliament will be a major one for fire safety in 2020 as the Grenfell enquiry picks up again on 27 January.

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Is fire safety management and fire risk assessment still not working well enough?

Fire safety could not have been more in the public spotlight than has been the case through 2017 to 2019. Arguably Government has not shown a greater level of attention on fire safety since the Great Fire of London in 1666 left 85% of the capital’s population homeless. And authorities could not be more under pressure from growing community awareness of the severe threats that fire poses if more care is not given to fire prevention and protection in practice.

We’ve seen the Expert Panel set up by Government to provide focus on immediate issues as they arise. There has been a Government-sponsored test programme on cladding testing which has led to a major review of BS standards covering facade test methods and procedures. Initial reaction led to combustibility questions which in turn resulted in a blanket requirement for residential blocks over 18 m to only have classified non-combustible materials on external walls. There has also been a major test programme followed through first on plastic-based composite doors, resulting in their removal from the market and major soul searching by the sector.

That was followed by extensive testing of timber fire doors from 25 manufacturers, which proved successful in all respects with good pass results in all cases, several tests indicating very significant safety margins in extended levels of timber fire door performance. We are told that attention has shifted to other types of cladding now under consideration. There has been the major review of fire safety carried out by Dame Judith Hackitt initiated by the Government as an immediate response to concerns arising from preliminary considerations of the Grenfell fire, initiated and completed before the Moore Blick Inquiry had hardly got off the ground.

Now in June 2019 there are major consultations from Government on what amounts to a root-and-branch reform of the regulatory system, following from the Government’s clear statement that they accept all the recommendations from Hackitt, and of the way the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 works in practice. The proposals are extensive; and they require a major cultural re-adjustment towards fire safety as Hackitt concluded necessary at an early stage of the review. Is all this activity producing results? Is the level of attention given to fire safety in practice yet as good as it needs to be given the potential threat from fire? Is there still a belief that in some way “the system will provide” and provisions for protection against fire really don’t need special consideration? Is sufficient notice really being taken in practice to counter the threats of fire?

Especially, are the principles of built-in fire safety protection in the fabric of a building using compartmentation, fire separation and active fire suppression as fully understood as they should be? 2019 has so far seen four major fires in different types of buildings which have all hit the headlines because of the circumstances and extensive destruction in all cases. The Ocado warehouse fire, the Beechmere Retirement Home, the Willenhall hotel and the Samuel Garside residential block fires all suggest that fire can break out in any situation and that buildings remain highly vulnerable to fire unless special measures are taken to limit fire growth, spread and development.

Nobody was injured or killed, miraculously. But chance could so easily have determined otherwise. The buildings were either completely destroyed or substantially damaged. The writing is there on the wall for all to read. We do not want another shock like Grenfell or Lakanal House.

The Hackitt report suggested that the fire safety system for buildings in the UK is broken. Despite all the activity initiated by Government and the warnings from numerous fire safety organisations and individuals, significant improvements will not arise – and the system will remain broken – until conscious positive steps are made in the way buildings are designed, constructed and maintained for protection against fire.

Special measures are necessary. Buildings are not naturally resilient and robust against fire. Particular built-in fire-resistant barriers are needed throughout a building and especially in key critical locations. And not to provide adequate provisions against fire spread can only be a false economy, risking not only major losses but sooner or later, at some point, serious threats to innocent lives.

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Competency is now the key word illustrated both by fire safety reforms and politics.

It isn’t often that headlines in the political sphere and fire safety overlap and become joined by a common theme.  In the USA, the UK Ambassador’s recent reporting back to London is revealed to have apparently expressed disparaging reservations over the White House environment. We are told, not denied by Government, of “unvarnished assessment” touching on effectiveness and functionality, reportedly describing the process as inept, unpredictable and riven by factions. 

Back home, Government might possibly think similar thoughts over the state of the construction industry attention on fire safety. 

Government has said that the shock of the enormity of the deaths in the horrific Grenfell fire has shaken trust.  Their response is a completely new regulatory structure of major reform proposals to effectively re-set fire safety on to new, more rigorous, robust and secure foundations. The extent of the reforms serves to illustrate the depth of concerns.

At the heart of the fire safety reforms, the Ambassador’s assessment and other threads running through the political landscape with its Brexit backdrop is the core concept of Competency (and of course the other side of the coin: incompetency).

But as both the Ambassador’s observations and the immediate instinctive reaction from the President Trump camp well reveal – thoughts on incompetency are subjective, dependent on a particular perspective and set of circumstances interpreted in a particular way.  We tend to recognise, or think we recognise, incompetency more than we would recognise competency, which tends to be automatically assumed and taken for granted. Who, other than for obscure devious means, might set out intentionally to act incompetently? No one.

The Government’s Regulatory Reform puts Competency centre stage.  That’s closely linked with personal Responsibility and Accountability for particular key named individuals in the design, construction and running of buildings.

The regulatory reform proposes an overarching competency council.  The process has started by running twelve working groups to examine competency considerations for some important professional roles, under the Construction Leadership Council which in turn will work with the Industry Safety Steering Group.  

But competency for fire safety is not yet sufficiently well-defined for common buy-in; and not yet explained clearly enough for all to absorb. That is an important first task for the oversight bodies and the new Building Safety Regulator. 

It has yet to be defined clearly enough what is actually meant in practice by competency.

How the competency of a whole industry can be pulled up to higher standards and levels of awareness in certain respects in double quick time is not yet given enough attention.  It is apparently assumed that levels of competency will be self-evaluated and that individuals will make their own honest assessments of what is needed for themselves. It is seemingly presumed by the reform that the right procedures and structures will emerge and that there will be enough competent people out there already to provide the training and development resource that will be needed to bring the whole industry up to common levels defined by acceptable standards (whatever those are ….).  

Above all in a field that is substantially practical the establishment needs to move away from reliance for competency on just academic-style learning.

Fire safety concerns practical matters; and formal training and qualifications through certificates can only take participants to first base. Theory isn’t enough.  Attendance at an information presentation or series of talks in a classroom environment does not magically make somebody completely competent enough in all important respects. Practical skills, know-how and expertise derived from personal and shared experiences are important for competency in fire safety. Personal attitudes are also important: there is no point in having the knowledge and awareness if that is not acted upon and carried out in practice. Understanding should go hand-in-hand with knowledge and experience.

Undoubtedly awareness and knowledge of products and product systems is key for many in the design, specification, procurement, supply and installation networks feeding construction. Above all, assumptions and unfounded decisions must not be made.  

In all cases, those seeking product information should go to the competent product supplier – that is the one who intimately knows and works with the product, knows the technology and importantly has the first-hand proprietary knowledge of the test performance of the product and the key product characteristics that underpin performance, making the product what it is for fire safety.

For ceramic glass there are important characteristics concerning its advantages in providing a long-lived resilient transparent barrier against fire which set it distinctively apart from standard fire-resistant glass. Ceramic has its own properties and key qualities for use in fire.  It is a distinctive material in its own right, with its own characteristics. And assumptions based only on experiences just with standard glass, or only theoretical handed-down explanations, are certainly not in any way sufficient at all to understand how ceramic glass performs in fire. 

FireLite and Sprinkler Systems

Sprinkler reliability makes another splash

Fire safety specialists can often be seen scratching their heads with furrowed brows in frustration and disbelief that sprinklers and other basic fire suppression systems are not more widely adopted in the UK than they currently are. The technology is straightforward. The intention quite fundamental in containing fire, working with compartmentation to limit the chances of early stage fire growth. The aim is to hold fire in check so that the fire and rescue service has time to finish the job of putting the fire out and mopping up.

Why suppression is not more widely adopted is something of a mystery. To reinforce the point, sprinkler advocates are quick at coming forward with reminders of the function and reliability of sprinkler systems based on statistical data, in the main from the USA. It’s all water under the bridge. But several major fires where the building was substantially destroyed have inevitably brought sprinklers back into the headlines.

Up-to-date information points to a high level of sprinkler reliability. A review of data made available suggests 95% operation where sprinklers are present combined with 99% effectiveness, which gives a bottom line overall operational reliability of 94%. Of course, failures are not unknown. It’s wise not to think sprinklers are infallible. That’s why, just like all safety systems, there needs to be back-up should events turn out in a way that was not originally assumed. Fire is notoriously unpredictable. That needs to be reflected in the use of integrated fire safety systems using suppression with effective fire separation barriers.

Of course, hot glass does not like cold water. That has to be a major factor given that modern buildings are so extensively founded on internal transparency and openness using glazing. Standard glass products are notoriously susceptible to thermal stress shock fracture. Failure under even quite mild stresses is likely.

But there is an answer. Fire-resistant ceramic glass is available here in the UK. It is specifically designed in its composition to be immune to thermal stress, with an ability to stay in one piece, untouched, even when covered from top to bottom and side to side with cold water. In testing FireLite has successfully shown resilience when sprayed with water after even 4-hour exposure in a fire-resistance test furnace. Ceramic glass is well known for its resilience to the USA firefighter hosestream test, under the impact of a high pressure full-on cold water stream over the hot exposed surface. Resilience against thermal stress shock is a remarkable property of ceramic glass. And that’s very useful in fire combined with water when confidence and assurance of fire safety – reducing risk to the lowest possible level – is a key requirement.

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Building a Safer Future: Reform of the building fire safety regulatory system – ticking the box and doing the bare minimum is no longer good enough

On 6 June the Government launched a major consultation covering proposals for a new fire safety regulatory regime primarily for high-rise residential blocks as well as consultation on a significant updating of the Fire Safety Order 2005 (FSO) for occupied non-domestic buildings.

The Government’s intent after all the shocks to fire safety is very clear: enforcement will be tightened and much better compliance achieved by holding named individuals responsible and accountable, subject even to legal process.
The proposals amount to a major revolution in the regulatory regime for fire safety in buildings. Fire safety will not be the same in the future as it has been in the past. The Government is seeking endorsement, but their course is clearly set. They are not asking questions over the structure of the changes – which is effectively fixed – but only on some of the associated finer details.

In May Communities Secretary James Brokenshire had made a clear that the scandal of unsafe fire risk cladding was a matter of Public Safety and could not be tolerated. Now we see the follow-up. There will be a new control system. A new Safety Regulator will be created to monitor, oversee, direct and take action, bringing even criminal charges if necessary. And there will, for sure, be less likelihood than in the past of fire safety not being given the focus that the risks of fire demand.

The main theme in the proposed reform of the building regulatory system is to tighten fire safety by focusing on a whole building and whole process approach concentrated and based on the risks of fire. Better compliance and stronger enforcement are the aims. Named individuals in key roles – for example the person owning and operating the building when occupied, the client for building projects, and key actors in the process such as the Principal Designer and the Principal Contractor – will be named, registered and held responsible and accountable as key recognised duty holders.

The scope concerns at this point high-rise residential buildings (over 18m) concerning new build from the beginning of the approvals and planning process through design to occupation. That’s where the most urgent response is needed. It is also proposed to extend the system to embrace refurbishment as well. But there are pointers in the consultation that the new system will not stop there. Higher risk types of buildings and occupancies are included in the consultation, for both building regulations and the FSO.

It isn’t sensible to have more than one building regulatory regime in action. So the common expectation is that the principles declared in this regulatory reform will come to be applied to all types and functions of buildings covering fire safety.

As paragraph 238 of the reform declares, the Government are considering placing all duty holders under a general duty to promote building safety and the safety of people in and around buildings. A duty is an implicit obligation. And duty holders are expected to be self-aware, to self-evaluate their competencies to discharge their core duties.

The Building a Safer Future consultation proposes that the central Building Safety Regulator (BSR) responsible for the new regime will provide what are referred to as “effective incentives” to those responsible for buildings (including those in responsible roles in the design, supply and build process) “to deliver high standards of safety”.

Those high standards cannot be achieved by just ticking boxes or doing just the bare minimum the reform makes unambiguously clear.

  • A three-step approach is proposed:
  • Reinforcement of operating standards and provision for professional guidance, on an “informal” basis (it is said) to secure compliance. What one could say is “friendly but firm advice”.
  • Proactive (and forceful) intervention and monitoring by the BSR to secure compliance, perhaps involving stop notices or improvement notices: effectively determined policing.

If non-compliance still persists then the Regulator can take formal enforcement action, which can include formal orders, penalties, perhaps revocation of the building safety certificate and even prosecution (which includes mention of criminal offences): a resort to unbending legal action.

A risk-based approach to building safety linked with the aim to develop high standards means that there will need to be a whole range of measures employed to minimise fire hazards and to reduce potential fire risks to manageable and controllable levels.

Clearly different building risk and occupancy profiles need to be countered by packages of fire safety provisions and precautions that are aligned and in accordance with those risks. That’s the central rationale for risk-based design.

Discussions within the fire safety sector are already talking of considering the measures that are necessary for property protection (not currently a main objective of building regulations).

It is natural that building owners and principal designers will now look ever more towards enhanced levels of protection against fire to protect both people and property assets.

The higher standards that come from considering property protection implicitly and automatically lead to higher standards to counter the higher risks from fire to people, especially in large and tall multi-occupancy buildings where escape is not so easy given major fire occurrence either inside or outside and where there is little margin for mistakes and assumptions on what might or might not happen.

Time is critically important in fire. And the threat of rapid fire growth in modern combustible building environments means that secure fire containment linked with effective suppression to minimise fire intensity and spread will become more important. Thoughts naturally lead to the application of sprinklers. And to longer fire resistance times for barriers intended to provide fire compartmentation. For protected escape the minimum standard is to provide 30-minute fire-resistant barriers determined in a furnace standardised test, when exposed to full fire development from one side.

Given the delays and confusions that can so easily arise in complex and congested buildings, 30 minutes is barely enough. In some cases, 60 minutes may be specified, but on a limited basis. But for more intense and longer fire times much longer fire resistance capability enhanced levels of resilience exposure are really required if risks are to be minimised to the lowest possible level.

The new system will be much less tolerant of unwarranted risks being taken with people’s lives.

Much longer robust resistance times are possible. FireLite ceramic because of its nature is effectively immune to thermal stress and has a high melting point well above typical temperatures in developed fire conditions. It has a well-established record of testing for a four hours exposure – retaining a transparent whole barrier, without any significant change. FireLite is also comfortable if sprayed by water from a firefighter hose stream or from an array of sprinklers. It is entirely possible to combine FireLite ceramic with sprinkler arrays to form a water curtain glazed array if designers want to search for the highest levels of assured protection against fire.

If better fire safety and higher standards are the aim now as this building regulatory reform intends, then the designer needs to look further afield than just on the standard minimum provisions that have come to be regarded as all that is necessary. If they do look further afield, then the designers and specifiers will find that there are solutions there, available to provide enhanced levels of fire-resistant protection against fire up to and including four hours under furnace test conditions of robust resistance using resilient ceramic glass which remains unchanged under aggressive fire conditions.

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Research reveals many architects don’t fully understand passive fire protection

New research reveals many architects don’t fully understand passive fire protection and fire resistance. Only 8% are reported to be able to correctly define four key fire safety terms, including fundamental concepts that should underpin basic fire safety design.

In its April edition Fire magazine featured a study commissioned by fire retardant technology company Zeroignition which has revealed that architects have amazing gaps in their knowledge base on fire safety. Architects were asked about their understanding of active fire protection, passive fire protection, reaction to fire and fire resistance terms. But 92% apparently failed to satisfy researchers that their understanding was complete – when the result should have been that nobody had any real doubts since all four requirements taken together are key in designing and building for fire safety.

Fire resistance is a key property of passive fire protection systems and it shouldn’t be possible to design modern buildings in compliance with building regulations if there isn’t a grasp of what fire resistance is all about. Fire resistance fundamentally means the ability of a product system and elements of construction, including those systems, to prevent the passage of fire from one side to the other.

Fire resistance therefore fundamentally contains the concept of fire containment, i.e. preventing the movement and development of fire away from and beyond the boundaries of the place where it first breaks out. Compartmentation is a basic fire design concept and that cannot be achieved without the use of fire-resistant passive fire protection barriers to contain fire.

It is really difficult to understand how a sample of architects can be so apparently lacking in their appreciation of what are fundamental principles for protecting buildings and people against fire. Yet 71% were found to admit to not understanding fire resistance.
A basic requirement of fire resistance is referred to as integrity. That requires the fire-resistant barrier to significantly prevent the physical passage of fire through the barrier, from one side to the other. To do that the barrier needs to stay in one piece, without catastrophic collapse and without cracking up to allow the passage of flames or hot ignitable fumes from the fire.

To do that requires special properties: not only resilience against thermal shock and thermal stress but also an ability not to soften and melt as heat builds up over time, or if the local fire load leads to a high intensity fire.
Fire resistance is a property established against prescribed pass/fail criteria by evaluation in standard tests by building the fire-resistant barrier into one wall of a gas or oil-fired furnace. The temperature-time profile is an internationally agreed standard, designed many years ago to represent a particular developed post-flashover fire condition. The test is carried out for set time periods to allow product and system classification. Those classification times are from 30 minutes minimum, up to 4 hours (i.e. 30, 60, 90, 120 and 240 minutes). Test temperatures approach 840 deg C after 30 minutes, rising gradually to around 1150 deg C after 4 hours (with high levels of heat build-up during the time of continuous heating).

Ceramic Glass Limited has been involved in fire safety since 1982 as a dedicated supplier of integrity fire-resistant ceramic glass FireLite. As a transparent ceramic FireLite has ideal properties to perform as a robust resilient barrier against fire. It has a softening point above typical flashover maximum temperatures in building fires and is specifically designed to be immune to thermal stress (as a result of an effective zero thermal expansion coefficient that avoids significant thermal stress generation).

FireLite is therefore ideal for use as vision panels and glazed screens. Use as an integrity barrier in external glazing can also be effective in preventing fire break-out and break back in for tall buildings should fire spread up the outside of the façade. It has the core property of being able to survive in tests for longer than 4 hours, even resisting without change the impact of a cold-water hose stream at the end of 4 hours exposure to demonstrate effective resilience against thermal shock and stress.

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